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action, the opinion in Longo v. Tobasso6 discussed the nile that a master is
responsible for hIs negligence in keeping and maintaining a servant with
dangerous propensities, and that he has a duty to exercise care to protect
third persons from the unlawful conduct of such a dangerous servant!
While the proposition seems to be one of first impression in Ohio, the court
did not question whether the rule exists in this state, for, by stating that
the cause of action was not sustained by the evidence, the court unplied that
the pleading stated a good cause of action.
MAUMCE S. CULP
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
An examination of several hundred cases reported by the supreme court
and the courts of appeals of Oho during the year 1952 fails to disclose any
particularly novel departure from precedent already established in the field
of appellate procedure, which phrase may also be taken to include the
familiar digest topic, "Appeal and Error." This is true despite the excellent
precedent provided by the federal courts' adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure' and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,2 together with
a number of amendments to both categories of rules since 1946, the adoption
in 1948 of new procedural rules by the courts of New Jersey which are pat-
terned after the federal rules, and progress in a number of other states toward
similar procedural improvement s
Perhaps a reason for the lack of procedural change is similar to that
stated by Judge Charles E. Clark of the Second Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals:
Judicial inertia, precedent mindedness, love of technical mceties-
all play their part in halting procedural improvement. So does, even
more, a professional attitude which looks down on the subject of pro-
cedure, save for an occasional broadside for its hasty reform. So does its
lengthy history, some portions of which are wearily techmcal, though
often not to the extent now assumed. So does the nature of the subject
matter, dealing as it does with routine which tends to progress only from
mere habit into ironbound routine
128 U.S.C. § 2072 (1950).
218 U.S.C. § 3771 (1951).
'In addition to the precedent of the courts and the legislatures, there is an excellent
recent text on procedure and judicial administration by the Chief Justice of the New
Jersey Supreme Court: CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. By Arthur T. Vanderbilt. New York: Washington
Square Publishing Corp. 1951. Pp. xx, 1390. $8.50. For a review of this new
book, see 4 WEST. RES. L REV. 188 (1952).
" Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules,
3 VAND. L REv. 493 (1950).
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Separate Appeals
A very recently decided case is Jolley v. Martn Brothers Box Co.5 The
supreme court held that the court of appeals, after reviewing an order of
the trial court overruling the defendants motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and entering judgment thereon for the plaintiff, com-
mitted error in dismissing, upon motion of the plaintiff, the defendant's
assignments of errors on a second appeal. The second appeal was brought
upon the record through the overruling of the defendant's motion for a new
trial and directed to a judgment on the verdict. It was dismissed by the
court of appeals on the ground that the validity of such assigned errors had
already been determined adversely to the defendant on the first appeal and
that such determination thereafter had become, as to such claimed errors,
res judicata.
In the face of the argument that the defendant was entitled to but one
appeal in the course of which all questions of error could have been de-
termined, the supreme court held that these two procedures were inde-
pendent of each other because there were two independent judgments in-
volved, and that the defendant could not predicate errors on the judgment
on the verdict in the second appeal until the motion for a new trial had been
overruled. The majority opinion pointed out that such action had not been
taken until defendant's first appeal upon its motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict had been disposed of. It is of interest to note that
Judge Hart, who wrote the majority opinion, also wrote one of the dissent-
ing opinions in the case of Green v. Acacaa Mutual Life Insurance Co.' upon
the question of a final order subject to review, the majority opinion in which
case has caused considerable comment during the past year.7
Amendment of the Petition
In the case of Cohen v. Bucey,8 the sole question was whether an amend-
ment to a petition in a negligence case adding allegations of willful and
wanton misconduct introduced a new and different cause of action so as to
bar the action because of the running of the statute of limitations. The
court held that the additional allegations of the amended petition did not
have the effect of stating an additional cause of action since the amendment
related back to the date upon which the action was commenced.
Modification of a Custody Order
In Trsckey v. Trsckey,9 a divorce action involving the custody of a
minor child, the court held that the trial court had continuing jurisdiction
respecting custody and discriminatory power to modify its original award-
ing order to the extent determined by it to be for the best interest of the
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minor child. Thus if there is an appeal on questions of law only, the court
of appeals may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court The
court cited its opinion in the case of Henry v. Henry,10 also decided in 1952,
where it held that if the judgment of a trial court depended upon evidence
and inferences to be drawn therefrom, the court of appeals on appeal on
questions of law only is ordinarily authorized to modify the judgment only
where the evidence is such as to require modification as a matter of law.
Procedure in Negligence
A negligence case which raised procedural questions was Brown v.
Cleveland Baseball Co.," in which an action was brought by an invitee of the
Cleveland Rams Football Club, a lessee of defendant's ball park, for injuries
sustained when temporary bleachers collapsed at a professional football
game. Because the evidence established that the defendant was in sub-
stantial occupation and control of the portion of the premises where the
plaintiff was injured, the supreme court held that the defendant was not
legally injured by the trial court's charge that the defendant as lessor had
full control of the premises. Even though the defendant merely retained
and exercised "substantial" occupation and control, the duty of care which
it owed the plaintiff as its lessees invitee was the same as if the defendant
had had full control.
Abuse of the Court's Discretion
The court, in Schmotzer v. Sixt, 2 considered the situation arising as a
result of two compamon cases on appeal on questions of law which had
been tried at the same time to a judge and jury, a verdict being rendered in
one case but not in the other, before which omission the jury had been dis-
charged and the jury members had conversed with one of the parties about
the case. The following day the trial court directed the jury to consider
further the case in which there was no verdict, and a verdict was subse-
quently returned. The court of appeals held that as to the second case the
trial court abused its discretion in overruling a motion for a new trial.
" 158 Ohio St. 416, 109 N.E.2d 652 (1952).
'156 Ohio St. 1, 16, 100 N.E.2d 211, 218 (1951).
'Hart and Hart, Review of Ohio Case Law For 1951, 47 Ohio Op. 287, 296
(1952); 12 OHrO ST. L.J. 476 (1951).
' 158 Ohio St. 159, 107 NXE.2d 333 (1952).
'158 Ohio St. 9, 106 N.E2d 772 (1952).
" 157 Ohio St. 319, 105 N.E.2d 406 (1952).
" 158 Ohio St. 1, 106 N.E.2d 632 (1952).
'91 Ohio App. 295, 108 N.E.2d 154, appeal dismissed, 157 Ohio St. 536, 106
N.E.2d 75 (1952).
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Another question as to the extent of a court's discretion arose in the
case of Cook v. Williams.:" The court of appeals held that a trial judge
was vested with discretion to decide whether to permit the plaintiff to re-
open his case for the introduction of additional evidence after resting the
case in chief and that the exercise of such discretion cannot be disturbed by
a reviewing court in the absence of a manifest abuse of such discretion.
In Schaible v. Cincnnati,14 the trial court directed a verdict for the
defendant but thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion to set it aside and
grant a new trial. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal and the su-
preme court affirmed, holding that since the journal entry of the trial court
setting the verdict aside and granting a new trial did not disclose the
grounds for such order and no abuse of discretion appeared in the record,
the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.15
An interesting case, Collins v. Yellow Cab Co.,' 6 raised a procedural
question which seemingly had not been previously decided. In a personal
injury case the trial court overruled a demurrer to interrogatories attached
to the plaintiff's petition and granted the defendant leave to plead before a
designated date. The defendant appealed on questions of law to the court
of appeals, which dismissed the appeal. The supreme court affirmed and
held that since no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court had been
shown, the overruling of the demurrer was not such a final order as to af-
fect a substantial right, determine the action or prevent judgment. It is
submitted that the supreme coures views on this question are entirely
sound, and it is surprising that there has heretofore apparently been no
determination of it in Ohio.
Appeal by an Administrative Board
A. DiCillo & Sons v. Chester Zomng Board of Appeals'7 was an action
brought to review the ruling of a township board of zoning appeals which
had denied the plaintiff a building certificate to enlarge a slaughter house
operating as a non-conforming building in a residential district. The com-
mon pleas court affirmed the decision of the board, and the plaintiff there-
after appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed the judgment of the
lower court. The supreme court, on the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the
defendant's appeal based upon a motion to certify the record, held that
neither the township board of zoning appeals nor any of its members had
'92 Ohio App. 277, 108 N.E.2d 232 (1952).
14157 Ohio St. 512, 106 N.E.2d 81 (1952).
1 Schwer v. New York, C. & St L. R.R., 156 Ohio St. 115, 100 N.E.2d 197
(1951); Green v. Acaca Mutual Life Ins. Co., 156 Ohio St. 1, 100 NE.2d 211
(1951).
18157 Ohio St. 311, 105 N.E.2d 395 (1952).
158 Ohio St. 302, 109 N.E.2d 8 (1952).
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